e-Journal Summary

e-Journal Number : 84940
Opinion Date : 12/22/2025
e-Journal Date : 01/13/2026
Court : Michigan Court of Appeals
Case Name : People v. Bruining
Practice Area(s) : Criminal Law
Judge(s) : Per Curiam - Redford,and Feeney; Dissent - M.J. Kelly,
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Issues:

Plea taking; MCR 6.301; People v Smith; Ineffective assistance; People v Douglas

Summary

The court held that the trial court did not err by declining to proceed with a plea after the prosecutor’s offer expired and that defendant failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. On the first day of trial, the prosecutor extended a plea offer with a short deadline. Defendant vacillated, asked questions, and made statements reflecting uncertainty and continued insistence he did not commit the charged conduct. He also failed to comply with the trial court’s effort to place him under oath after he said at one point that “I guess I’m taking the plea deal.” The deadline elapsed “without defendant complying with the trial court’s instruction.” The parties proceeded to trial and the jury convicted defendant of first-degree murder and second-degree arson. On appeal, the court stated the prosecutor has “constitutional authority to determine the charge or charges a defendant will face,” and a trial court may not accept a plea to a lesser charge without the prosecutor’s consent. It further emphasized there is “no absolute right to have a guilty plea accepted” because a trial “court may reject a plea in exercise of sound judicial discretion.” The court held that defendant did not accept the plea offer before the time limit expired and identified no prejudice from reliance on the offer. It noted a prosecutor may revoke an offer before acceptance absent prejudice, and the record showed the trial court attempted to initiate plea-taking by instructing defendant to stand and raise his right hand, but defendant remained equivocal and did not proceed under oath before the offer was no longer available. The court explained that once the offer expired, the trial court could not “usurp the prosecutor’s constitutional authority” by reinstating it without consent, and it was not an abuse of discretion to end discussions and forgo a plea colloquy. Turning to the ineffective assistance claim, the court applied the plea-stage prejudice framework and held that defendant could not show the outcome of the plea process would have been different because his own indecision and failure to timely accept the offer caused the trial to proceed. The prosecutor withdrew the offer due to the deadline passing, and the trial court could not accept a plea without prosecutorial consent. Affirmed.

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