Juror misconduct; People v Budzyn; Lay or expert opinion; MRE 701; People v Dobek; Prosecutorial misconduct; People v Fyda

The court held that juror misconduct did not create a real and substantial possibility of affecting the verdict, that any error in admitting a detective’s testimony was not outcome-determinative, and that the prosecutor’s closing argument was not improper. Defendant, a physical therapist, was tried on multiple CSC charges based on testimony from several complainants and other witnesses. The jury convicted on some counts and acquitted on others. After trial, defendant moved for a new trial based on a juror’s outside research about the timing of media coverage in an unrelated high-profile case, a detective’s testimony on redirect about whether sexual assault suspects commonly have multiple victims, and a closing remark that defense counsel was trying to “distract” the jury. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and denied relief. On appeal, the court reiterated jurors may consider only evidence presented in open court and that where extraneous facts enter deliberations, a defendant must show exposure and that it created “a real and substantial possibility” of affecting the verdict, requiring “a direct connection between the extrinsic material and the adverse verdict.” The juror researched when a nationally televised interview aired and compared it to when a complainant came forward. But the court held that the record showed the other jurors immediately shut down that discussion, the juror testified the information did not affect the panel, and she testified she would have voted guilty even without the research. Thus, defendant failed to meet the Budzyn prejudice threshold. As to the detective’s redirect testimony, the court acknowledged the testimony was based on experience and explained that even if it should have been treated as expert testimony, the detective’s background supported qualification. Further, in any event the statement did not more probably than not affect the outcome given the length of trial and the jury’s differentiated verdicts. Finally, the court found no prosecutorial misconduct, holding the prosecutor’s “distraction” comment was a permissible response to defense themes and consistent with precedent recognizing prosecutors may characterize defense theories as distractions without suggesting defense counsel disbelieves the defendant. And because the comment was not improper, counsel was not ineffective for failing to object. Affirmed.