Declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of MCL 333.2451 (part of the Public Health Code); Mootness; T & V Assocs v Director of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs

Pursuant to T & V, the court held that plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief to the effect that MCL 333.2451 is unconstitutional is moot. Thus, it reversed the trial court’s conclusion that this declaratory judgment action was not moot, and vacated “the portion of the trial court’s decision ruling on the constitutionality of MCL 333.2451[,]” part of the Public Health Code (PHC). “Plaintiff operates a barbeque restaurant, the Iron Pig,” that was subject to an emergency order entered by defendant in 11/20 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Plaintiff filed this action in 2023, “challenging, in part, the constitutionality of MCL 333.2451, on which the subject order was partially based[.]” While the order “had been rescinded, the trial court determined that” this action was not moot, based on the court’s decision in T & V, and reached the merits. The Supreme Court later peremptorily reversed the court’s “decision in T & V, which likewise involved a long-since rescinded emergency COVID-19 order issued under another provision of the” PHC. The court concluded the same analysis the Supreme Court applied there applied here. There was “no dispute that the authority under which defendant issued the contested order, MCL 333.2451, was rescinded before plaintiff” filed this action. Thus, it was impossible for the trial court or the court “to grant plaintiff any relief, because plaintiff presently continues to operate its Iron Pig restaurant unabated. Like the trial court, this Court cannot undo, or otherwise involve itself in the enforcement of, a public health order that no longer exists. Further, as in T & V, circumstances related to COVID-19 have drastically changed since defendant issued the subject order, such that COVID-19 no longer presents an urgently pressing public health crisis. And, as in T & V, it is merely a hypothetical possibility that a similar order may issue again one day, the mere ‘possibility that an issue will recur is not sufficient.’”