Due process; Referring to jurors only by numbers; Confrontation Clause; Witness testifying with her face obscured; Consecutive sentencing; MCL 750.520b(3); Judgment of sentence (JOS)

The court held that the trial court did not violate defendant’s due-process rights by referring to jurors only by numbers or infringe his confrontation right by allegedly permitting the victim to testify with her face obscured. It also found that the two events he “was convicted of were not ‘part of a continuous time sequence,’ and the statutory discretion to impose a consecutive sentence under MCL 750.520b(3) was not triggered.” Thus, it affirmed his convictions, vacated his sentence, and remanded for resentencing for the purpose of amending his JOS to reflect that his sentences are concurrent rather than consecutive. He was convicted of CSC I and sentenced to 25 to 80 years for each conviction, to be served consecutively. On appeal, defendant first argued “that his constitutional due-process rights were violated because the trial court referred to the potential jurors by number instead of their names during voir dire.” He argued “that the trial court should have instructed the jurors to ensure that they did not consider this fact as a negative against his presumed innocence.” He relied “heavily on several federal cases, quoting portions that discuss considerations relevant to addressing jurors by name rather than by number. Although those quotations appear to support his position, the cases themselves do not. Each of the authorities he cites ultimately holds that the use of juror numbers, in the absence of demonstrated prejudice, does not constitute reversible error.” In this case, defendant had “offered no evidentiary basis to substantiate his assertion that he suffered prejudice from the trial court’s decision to refer to jurors by number rather than by name. Contrary to his implicit assertion that he was unable to conduct meaningful voir dire, the record establishe[d] that his trial counsel received a ‘juror packet’ containing pertinent biographical information related to the potential jurors.” Moreover, the record established “that defense counsel conducted extensive voir dire; in particular, defense counsel exercised several peremptory challenges.” Therefore, there was “no evidence to support defendant’s argument that his ability to conduct voir dire was obstructed.” Defendant also argued “that his presumption of innocence was compromised because the trial court did not properly instruct the jurors as to how they should perceive reference to them by number instead of by name. We have cautioned trial courts to give such an instruction and to limit the cases where juror numbers are used instead of names.” The court has “also held that it is proper to decline to review claims of prejudice in the withholding of jurors’ names when there is no evidence in the record of prejudice.” In this case, there was “no evidence in the record to suggest that the jurors construed the use of numbers as a negative to be held against defendant.” The record suggested “that both the trial court and the jurors understood the use of numbers as a purely logistical choice devoid of any greater meaning.” Thus, the court concluded that his “due-process rights were not violated by using juror numbers instead of names at trial.”