Res judicata; Foster v Foster; Riparian rights; MCL 324.30101(s); Thies v Howland; Public easement scope; Malicious prosecution; Special injury; Friedman v Dozorc; Sanctions for a frivolous action; MCL 600.2591(3)(a)

The court held that plaintiffs’ riparian-rights claims were barred by res judicata because prior litigation involving the same property through privies in title resolved, or could have resolved, the riparian-rights dispute by establishing a public easement to the water’s edge. But the trial court erred by granting summary disposition on defendants’ malicious prosecution claim and by imposing attorney-fee sanctions on plaintiffs. Plaintiffs sought declarations and injunctions after installing private docks and blocking a boat launch, while defendants relied on decades-old litigation establishing a highway-by-user easement. On appeal, the court held that res judicata applied. A second action is barred when “(1) the prior action was decided on the merits, (2) both actions involve the same parties or their privies, and (3) the matter in the second case was, or could have been, resolved in the first,” and Michigan uses a transactional test where “the assertion of different kinds or theories of relief still constitutes a single cause of action if a single group of operative facts give rise to the assertion of relief.” Earlier decisions established a public easement on the property “from a point six feet east of the hard top surface to the waters of” the lake, and the prior court’s reasoning expressly recognized public use for shoreline activities “including the launching of boats, swimming, shore fishing, parking and washing of automobiles[.]” This supported the conclusion that “riparian rights do not exist” for plaintiffs because “a contrary intention” appeared in the chain of title by court decree. The court also held that plaintiffs’ remaining claims failed because each required interference with established property rights, and the public easement authorized the road commission’s entry and enforcement actions, including removing boulders and prohibiting unpermitted docks. The court next held that defendants’ malicious prosecution claim failed for lack of special injury, noting the required element is “special injury that flows directly from the prior proceedings,” and the cited injury preceded the lawsuit and thus, could not satisfy that requirement. The trial court erred by granting summary disposition on that counterclaim. The court also held that sanctions were improper because the record did not support a finding plaintiffs’ action was frivolous, emphasizing prior cases were not so obvious that plaintiffs’ position was “devoid of arguable legal merit,” making sanctions “outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” Affirmed in part, vacated in part.