Hostile work environment; Statute of limitations; Garg v Macomb Cnty Mental Health; Campbell v Department of Human Servs; Hester v Department of Corr (Unpub); Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA) retaliation; Exclusion of most evidence related to dismissed discrimination & hostile work environment claims; Hearsay; Quashing of multiple trial subpoenas; Exclusion of the evidence of plaintiff’s internal complaints of discrimination; Motion to exclude future damages; Disqualification of the trial judge; Second Amended Complaint (SAC)

The court upheld the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim. But it concluded that “defendant’s purported termination of plaintiff’s employment, in addition to [her] other protected activity for which she contends she has also suffered continued retaliation, provides evidence of it being retaliation for her ongoing protected activity.” Thus, it reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded, but it found there was no basis for disqualification of the trial judge. Plaintiff, an African-American woman, contended “the hostile and abusive environment substantially interfered with her employment where she went on medical leave in [9/19] and went on anxiety and depression medication and began therapy due to her work environment.” The court noted that in Campbell, it “held that ‘acts occurring outside the limitations period, although not actionable, may, in appropriate cases, be used as background evidence to establish a pattern of discrimination.’” Defendant asserted that plaintiff did not establish an issue of material fact as to the purported harassment. The court found that while she relied “on Hester in support of the second element of a prima facie case, in that unpublished decision four co-workers testified that the plaintiff received more and less desirable work that Caucasian employees refused.” It found that here, “corroborative evidence that plaintiff was singled out in the manner claimed on the basis of her protected status is lacking. That said, ‘[a] party’s own testimony, standing alone, can be sufficient to establish a genuine question of fact.’ Nonetheless, even considering the age-and-race-based discrimination evidence from outside the statute of limitations as potentially demonstrating a pattern, we find no genuine issue of material fact connecting plaintiff’s complaints of communication and conduct within the statute of limitations period to her protected status.” Further, the court found “no genuine issue of material fact as to whether [her] complaints of communication and conduct within the three-year statute of limitations period, amount to her workplace being ‘permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult[] that is sufficiently pervasive or severe’ to constitute a hostile work environment considering the totality of the circumstances, including co-workers not liking the scent of her lotion, avoiding working with her, a Caucasian man being promoted more quickly than her, a year-end performance review having a perceived negative tone, the whiteboard push incident that was unreported for two years, and being accused of tampering with a manager’s chair.” But the court agreed with her that the trial court erred in granting defendant summary disposition of her retaliation claim and in limiting the scope of her “claim to retaliatory termination for filing her initial civil complaint in this matter on” 1/31/20.