Sufficiency of the evidence for CSC I; MCL 750.520a(r); People v Legg; Verdict form waiver; People v Kowalski; Ineffective assistance as to verdict form; People v Yeager; Jury request to review testimony; MCR 2.513(P); People v McDonald; Speedy trial (Barker factors); People v Williams; 180-day rule; MCL 780.131(1); People v Witkoski; Prosecutorial misconduct; People v Mullins; Department of Corrections (DOC)

The court held that defendant was not entitled to relief because the evidence was sufficient to support his CSC I convictions, he waived the verdict-form challenge, no jury coercion occurred during deliberations, and no speedy-trial, 180-day, or prosecutorial-misconduct errors warranted reversal. Defendant was convicted of CSC I and II involving an 11-year-old and later raised multiple posttrial challenges, all of which the trial court rejected on remand. On appeal, the court held the evidence was sufficient for CSC I because the victim testified defendant touched her “private part” with his tongue, explaining that “cunnilingus requires the placing of the mouth of a person upon the external genital organs,” and reiterating that “the testimony of a victim need not be corroborated.” The court next found the verdict-form issue was waived because counsel expressly approved the jury instructions, stating, “When the trial court asks whether a party has any objections to the jury instructions and the party responds negatively, it is an affirmative approval.” And counsel was not ineffective because the jury was instructed it “had to find beyond a reasonable doubt” that the victim was under 13 and defendant was 17 or older, facts that were undisputed. The court also determined the trial court acted within its discretion by denying the jury’s request to review testimony while “not foreclos[ing] the possibility” of later review, which did not coerce a verdict under MCR 2.513(P). The court rejected the speedy-trial claim after applying the four-factor test and concluding the prosecution rebutted presumed prejudice, noting the record showed neutral or defense-attributable delays and that “there is no evidence of prejudice.” The court also rejected the 180-day claim, explaining the statute is triggered by DOC notice and requires only that action be commenced within 180 days, which occurred here. Finally, the court held the prosecutor’s closing argument did not amount to misconduct, emphasizing credibility arguments must be reviewed in context and that statements the complainant “had no reason to lie” were not vouching absent any claim of special knowledge. Affirmed.