Timeliness of an adjudication trial; MCR 3.972(A); Waiver; Reasonable reunification efforts; Exercise of jurisdiction; MCL 712A.2(b)(1) & (2); Specification of the requirements for reunification at the initial disposition hearing; Starting the hearing without a respondent present; MCR 3.973(D)(3); Reading the petition to the jury at the adjudication trial; MCR 3.972(B)(2); Admission of a no-contest plea to fourth-degree child abuse; In re Lewis; In re Andino

The court held that respondent-mother waived the timeliness requirement for the adjudication trial, and that reasonable efforts were made to reunify her with her children. Further, the trial court did not err in exercising jurisdiction, and the court rejected her arguments related to her disposition. As to respondent-father, it held that the trial court did not plainly err in reading the petition to the jury at the adjudication trial or in allowing the jury to consider his no-contest plea. Thus, in these consolidated appeals the court affirmed the trial court’s adjudication and initial order of disposition as to the mother and the adjudication as to the father. Their three children were removed from their care. As to the mother’s claim that the DHHS did not make reasonable reunification efforts before the trial, the court found that the record was “replete with examples showing that” it did. Both an initial service plan and case service plan were created, which listed her “needs, the requirements for each need, and the services that would be provided to facilitate reunification. These services included assistance with developing parenting skills, having supervised visitation, and providing transportation.” The plans were updated months later, and they continued to list her “needs, requirements, and the offered services. A review of the case service plan shows that DHHS workers contacted [the] mother on numerous occasions and discussed services, family team meetings, and other matters with her. Testimony at the adjudication trial similarly shows that DHHS offered [her] numerous services. [It] also followed the recommendations from [her] psychological evaluation by referring her for a substance abuse assessment and offering counseling, therapy, and supervised visitation.” As to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction, “there was ample evidence for [it] to conclude that [the] mother subjected the children to a substantial risk of harm to their mental wellbeing and to an unfit home environment by reason of neglect, criminality, and cruelty.” As to the father, the court rejected his claim “that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to consider his no-contest plea to fourth-degree child abuse.” It noted that “there was independent proof of the misconduct that led to the no-contest plea” and it found that his conviction “was material and relevant” in this case.