Imposition of attorney fees in a termination case; Due process; Indigent parents’ right to appointed counsel; In re Williams; MCL 712A.17c(5); MCR 3.915(B)(1)(a)(i); Premature appointment, Reimbursement; MCL 712A.25(1); MCL 712A.17c(8); MCR 3.915(E) & 3.916(D); Lawyer-guardian ad litem (L-GAL)

The court held that the trial court abused its discretion and violated petitioners-legal guardians’ due-process rights by ordering them to reimburse it “for the court-appointed attorney fees incurred by respondent-mother and the L-GAL” after they filed a petition to terminate respondents’ parental rights. As an initial matter, the court found that the appointment of counsel was premature. When the trial court entered the initial order for reimbursement of the mother’s “court-appointed attorney fees, no hearings had occurred in the child protective proceedings. [The] mother was never on record requesting an attorney, and the trial court had not determined her ability to pay.” While it had reason to believe she was indigent, it was still “required to follow the procedure” in MCL 712A.17c(5) and MCR 3.915(B)(1)(a). The court noted the appointment of counsel occurred before the trial court received a financial statement indicating the mother had no income or assets. “Further, it did not negate the fact no hearing had yet occurred.” The court also concluded that, even if it ignored “the errors in the appointment process, and” assumed that respondents were entitled to court-appointed counsel, petitioners were “not responsible for paying for that counsel.” Under MCL 712A.25(1), generally, “for court-appointed counsels, ‘expenses incurred in carrying out this chapter shall be paid upon the court’s order by the county treasurer from the county’s general fund.’” The court noted “there is some leeway for” a trial court to assess costs of representation against parties, but “MCL 712A.17c(8), MCR 3.915(E), and MCR 3.916(D) require the trial court to determine a party’s ability to pay for an attorney, appoint an attorney, and then assess costs against that same party or someone responsible for supporting the party. Petitioners are not responsible for” the mother. While they are the child’s guardians, “they are not ‘legally obligated to pay for the ward from the guardian’s own money.’” Respondents, who retain their parental rights, are required to pay child support. The court held that the “trial court’s decision to require petitioners to reimburse the trial court for the court-appointed attorney fees of respondent-mother and the L-GAL constituted a legal error and was outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” Vacated and remanded.