Sentencing; Fees, fines, & costs; People v Godfrey; People v Krieger; People Konopka (On Remand); MCL 769.1k; Mandatory assessments; MCL 769.1k(1)(a); MCL 769.1j(2); MCL 780.905(1)(a) & (4); Discretionary assessments; MCL 769.1k(1)(b); Scoring of OV 19 at 10 points; Mootness; People v Carey; Judgment of sentence (JOS)

The court concluded that defendant was entitled to resentencing on the issue of fees, fines, and costs, but was not entitled to relief on OV 19. Thus, it affirmed in part and vacated in part her 7/5/24 JOS following the revocation of her probation and remanded for resentencing. She argued “that once the trial court revoked defendant’s probation and resentenced her, it did not have authority to order defendant to pay the fees, fines, and costs that were previously assessed as part of her now-extinguished probation order.” The court agreed, in part. She was “partially correct insofar as the fees, fines, and costs in [her] initial [JOS] were extinguished when the trial court discharged defendant from probation. But the trial court did have authority to impose financial assessments at resentencing.” Defendant relied primarily on Krieger, but “unlike in Krieger, in this case the trial court did have statutory authority to impose fees, fines, and costs at resentencing.” Also, because she pled “guilty to two felonies, the trial court was required to assess her $136.” Further, the court held that here, “the trial court had discretion to impose the $250 fine, $250 in court costs, and $1,292 in attorney fees.” Thus, unlike in Krieger, “the trial court was statutorily authorized to impose the fees, fines, and costs that appeared on” her 7/5/24 JOS following the revocation of probation. Defendant overstated “her case by asserting that the trial court had no such authority. However, the trial court did commit several errors in imposing the financial assessments in this case.” As to OV 19, first, she “has appropriately advised the Court that she has been released on parole, potentially rendering her challenge to the trial court’s guidelines calculation moot.” However, because she “remains on parole, and is therefore subject to the possibility of parole revocation and reincarceration on her current sentence, we conclude that her challenge to OV scoring is not moot.” Second, it was unclear whether she “can challenge her guidelines score on appeal from a probation violation sentence when the score was calculated and could have been challenged at her initial sentencing.” The court concluded that defendant’s challenge to OV 19 scoring lacked merit as well. Thus, as in Carey, it did not need to decide whether she “is allowed to raise the issue on appeal from resentencing; we assume, without deciding, that the issue is properly before us.” Returning to OV 19, the court found that “a preponderance of the evidence supports scoring OV 19 at 10 points because defendant attempted to interfere with the administration of justice by refusing to identify herself, refusing to comply with the police officers’ lawful commands, and physically resisting arrest.”