Whether the Speedy Trial Act was violated, 18 USC § 3161(c)(1); Whether pretrial motions “stopped the clock”; Speedy trial rights under the Sixth Amendment; Challenge to search warrant affidavits; Right to self-representation; Cross-examination of a government witness about a Seventh Circuit case; FRE 403; Right of confrontation; Sentencing; Substantive reasonableness; Motion to supplement counsel’s briefing

The court held that defendant-Richards’s right to a speedy trial was not violated where the 70-day time limit was properly paused based on the filing of pretrial motions. His related Sixth Amendment claim also failed. Further, the district court did not err in denying his motion to suppress based on the search warrant affidavits or his mid-trial motion to represent himself. It also did not abuse its discretion in limiting his cross-examination of a government witness under FRE 403, and the court rejected his substantive reasonableness challenge to his sentence. A jury convicted Richards of trafficking minors, sexually exploiting children, and FIP. He argued that he was denied a speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment. The court explained that the Act provides that certain events may stop the 70-day clock. In this case, it stopped upon the filing of his motion to suppress and did not restart until 30 days after the parties submitted post-hearing briefs. The district “court had a ‘preference’ for post-hearing briefs that it would consider and ‘then’ rule on. . . . And it certainly didn’t abuse its discretion by tolling the clock while it was waiting for those briefs.” The clock stopped again when the district court took a motion for a status conference under advisement. Richards argued that the motion was improperly filed because it failed to comply with local rules. But the court held that “the Act doesn’t require motions to be ‘properly filed’ to stop the clock. It merely requires ‘filing[,]’” which takes place “when a court officer accepts a document for entry into the record.” After the clock resumed, 38 days remained, and the trial began 32 days later. His argument under the Sixth Amendment also failed where delay caused by the defendant “doesn’t count for purposes of calculating overall delay[,]” and the delay here was not “‘uncommonly long.’” As to the search warrant affidavits, the court held that he was not entitled to a Franks hearing where he could not show that his allegations about alleged falsehoods were “‘critical to the finding of probable cause.’” It further held that his right to cross-examination was not violated where he sought to cross-examine the witness “about an old and unrelated” Seventh Circuit case. As to his below-Guidelines 480-month sentence, his claim that the district court’s downward variance did not go far enough had no merit. Finally, the court denied his delayed motion to supplement his counsel’s briefing. Affirmed.