Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (g), & (j); In re Jackisch/Stamm-Jackisch; Reasonable reunification efforts; In re Hicks/Brown; Disability accommodations; Due process; In re Contempt of Pavlos-Hackney; Transcript deficiencies; People v Craig; Child’s best interests; In re Mota

The court held that the DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts, due process was not denied by transcript deficiencies, §§ (c)(i), (g), and (j) were met, and termination served the child’s best interests. The child was removed two days after birth after concerns about respondent-mother’s compliance with care for mental-health issues, respondent-father’s lack of insight into how those issues affected the mother’s parenting, their failure to sufficiently feed the child at the hospital, and the father’s cocaine use, including a positive test. The trial court terminated their parental rights under §§ (c)(i), (g), and (j). On appeal, the court held that the DHHS made reasonable efforts to accommodate the mother’s intellectual-capacity and mental-health disabilities because it attempted assessments and tailored programming, but she “refused to participate in IQ evaluations until late in the case” and she did not “engage with the services that were provided.” It next held that due process was not impaired by transcript problems because the record was “sufficient for appellate review,” the “audio drop” and “unintelligible” notations were “largely limited to single words or syllables,” and “it is easy to determine the missing words from context,” and the mother “has not identified any way in which she was prejudiced by this issue.” The court further found that clear and convincing evidence supported termination under §§ (c)(i), (g), and (j) because the father’s primary barrier to reunification was his decision to remain in a relationship with the mother despite knowing she “could not provide for the child,” and although he testified he was willing to separate, “the record did not support that he was actually willing to do so.” The opinion also relied on the father’s continuing cocaine use and lack of insight, noting he tested positive, admitted using cocaine “a couple of days before the first termination hearing,” and missed screens and declined peer support. The court also held that termination served the child’s best interests because she had spent “almost her entire life in foster care,” was thriving in a stable placement with a foster family willing to adopt, and needed “permanency, stability, and finality[.]” Affirmed.