Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); In re White; Reasonable reunification efforts; In re Hicks/Brown; Disability accommodations; In re Frey; Child’s best interests; In re Rippy

The court held that the DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts, § (c)(i) was met, and termination served the child’s best interests. The child tested positive for cocaine and methadone at birth, respondent-mother admitted using drugs in the days before the birth, and the DHHS filed a petition that resulted in the child’s placement in foster care. The trial court later terminated the mother’s parental rights under §§ (c)(i), (g), and (j) after she largely failed to participate in services. She attended only 2 of 77 offered drug screens and 10 of 45 offered parenting times, missed 21 visits without calling or appearing, and then allowed parenting time to be suspended without seeking reinstatement, while also missing hearings and losing contact with the agency. On appeal, the court held that reasonable efforts were made despite the absence of a new psychological evaluation because the mother already had a psychological evaluation from a prior termination case, the results were available to the caseworker, and the caseworker discussed a “psych eval” and offered help setting one up, but the mother “refused this help each time.” It also emphasized that reunification requires participation, citing the DHHS’s “affirmative duty to make reasonable efforts to reunify a family” while recognizing “a commensurate responsibility on the part of [a] respondent[] to participate in the services that are offered.” It found the record showed the mother “did not engage with the services that were offered,” particularly by failing to attend screens that were necessary even to begin counseling. The court next found that § (c)(i) was established because the conditions included substance abuse and an unstable home situation, and the mother did not address them, relying on the principle that termination is appropriate “when the conditions that brought the children into foster care continue to exist despite time to make changes and the opportunity to take advantage of a variety of services.” It concluded the mother’s lack of engagement, her failure to screen, and her statements that tests would be positive supported that the conditions continued and were unlikely to be rectified within a reasonable time. The court also held that termination served the child’s best interests because evidence showed the bond with the mother was limited, while the child had a strong bond with the foster family, referred to the foster parents as “mom and dad,” had been in foster care for “roughly one and one-half years,” and the foster family met the child’s needs and was willing to adopt. Affirmed.