Ineffective assistance of counsel; Alibi notice; MCL 768.20(1); People v Pickens; Hearsay; MRE 802; People v Smith; Other-acts evidence; Disclosure; MCL 768.27b; People v Wisniewski; Prior consistent statement; MRE 801(d)(1)(B); People v Jones; Character evidence; MRE 404(a)(1); People v Roper

The court held that defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel and affirmed his CSC III conviction. Defendant was convicted of CSC III after the victim testified that she woke up in her dorm room to him pulling down her pants, that he pinned her legs, pushed her down, shushed her, and said “it will be over soon,” and that he penetrated her while pinning her wrist above her head. The record also included testimony that he later told a friend that he had taken advantage of her while she was asleep. On appeal, the court held that counsel performed deficiently by failing to file an alibi notice despite intending to present school records and testimony from defendant’s mother, and it found “no conceivable strategic reason to omit filing the statutorily required notice.” It nonetheless ruled that defendant failed to show prejudice because the proposed alibi proof did not cover the full range of possible dates and, despite the trial court’s ruling, “the jury ultimately heard the contested alibi testimony” from defendant’s mother. The court next concluded that even if counsel should have objected to hearsay about the victim’s PTSD and other diagnoses, the error did not undermine confidence in the verdict given the “isolated and limited nature” of the testimony and the corroborating proofs, including defendant’s admission to a friend. It also determined that testimony about prior domestic-violence acts was admissible where the prosecution’s disclosures provided notice and the evidence explained why the victim said she did not fight back because “I was scared,” making it probative and “not outweighed by unfair prejudice.” The court further held that the roommate’s account of what the victim disclosed qualified as a prior consistent statement offered to rebut the defense theory that she fabricated the allegation as a “woman scorned.” It found no reasonable probability of a different outcome from counsel’s failure to object to the roommate’s brief comment that defendant was “slightly angry,” and it rejected challenges to similar testimony from the interviewing detective because any objection would have been futile.