Beach of a purchase agreement; Real party in interest

Concluding that the trial court erred by holding that plaintiff-Tectara was not the real party in interest in this case alleging breach of a real property purchase agreement, the court reversed and remanded. The court held that Tectara is the real party in interest, “notwithstanding that the funds Tectara paid to [defendant-]Smith may have been derived from fraudulent conduct and may ultimately be determined to belong to and be properly payable to a nonparty (rather than Tectara). The trial court erred by deciding otherwise.” Smith argued that a nonparty (B), “rather than Tectara, was the source of the funds paid to Smith. Regardless of the source of the funds, however, Tectara was the party to the purchase agreement, and it therefore was the real party in interest. Moreover, although [B] repeatedly asserted his Fifth Amendment rights during his deposition, he did testify that” another individual (S) “was Tectara’s attorney, that Tectara had a bank account on [1/20/21], and that [S] ‘had money there to pay Angela Smith $250,000.’” Although Smith asserted that B “refused to answer more detailed questions about the origin of the funds wired to Smith by [S], [B’s] answers, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, establish a genuine issue of material fact on this issue, particularly when considered along with Smith’s email acknowledging the wire transfer and stating that it was ‘towards the purchase’ of the property described in the purchase agreement.” Also, Smith’s claim that Tectara could not “establish an entitlement to damages fails for similar reasons.” The court appreciated “the trial court’s quandary in adjudicating a claim for breach of contract in which Tectara seeks to recover funds that may have been fraudulently obtained while [B] (who signed the purchase agreement for Tectara) refused to answer questions that could have clarified matters.” However, it had to “conclude that the trial court erred by holding that Tectara was not the real party in interest, and that it accordingly erred by granting Smith’s motion for summary disposition on those grounds.”