Goose attack; Negligence versus premises liability; Nathan v David Leader Mgmt, Inc; Ferae naturae; Glave v Michigan Terminix Co; Whether an animal can qualify as a condition of the land for premises-liability purposes; Tripp v Baker; Contractor duty; Loweke v Ann Arbor Ceiling & Partition LLC

The court held that ferae naturae barred plaintiff’s negligence claims against both defendants, but the complaint stated a viable premises-liability claim against defendant-Ascension. Plaintiff alleged he was attacked by a goose on Ascension’s premises, that employees and security personnel said the goose had been an “ongoing danger” and had attacked others, and that defendants failed to remove it or warn of its presence. He sustained a fractured hip requiring surgery. The trial court dismissed all claims, reasoning that liability for a wild animal requires allegations of “dominion, control, or possession,” and the complaint did not allege either defendant had such control over the goose. On appeal, the court agreed negligence was foreclosed because, absent allegations a defendant “‘tamed, confined, or otherwise controlled’” the animal, ferae naturae “generally applies to preclude relief,” and plaintiff alleged only that Ascension was the “owner and/or possessor of the property,” which “is a claim sounding in premises liability.” It also affirmed dismissal as to defendant-Teachout because the complaint did not allege Teachout possessed or controlled the premises, and contractual obligations did not create “a separate and distinct duty owed to plaintiff.” Turning to Ascension, the court ruled the complaint sounded in premises liability because plaintiff alleged injury from “a dangerous condition on the land.” It held that an animal can qualify as a condition of the land for premises-liability purposes, explaining that in that framework “an animal can be considered a dangerous condition on the land,” and that “a goose, like a dog, can pose an ‘artificial risk’ to invitees.” Because plaintiff alleged the goose was nesting on the property, that Ascension knew of prior attacks, and that Ascension failed to warn or respond, the pleading was “legally sufficient to survive” a summary disposition motion under (C)(8) as to a premises-liability claim against Ascension. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.