Ineffective assistance of counsel related to a jury trial waiver & preparing defendant for trial; Sufficiency of the evidence for possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of fentanyl, possession with intent to deliver meth, & felony-firearm; Constructive possession; People v Wolfe; Judgment of sentence (JOS)

Agreeing with the trial court that defendant did not establish that his trial attorney’s (S) representation was objectively unreasonable, the court concluded the trial court properly denied his motion for a new trial. The court also held that there was sufficient evidence of his constructive possession of the drugs and firearms to support his convictions. He was convicted of possession with intent to deliver meth and less than 50 grams of fentanyl, and felony-firearm. His ineffective assistance of counsel claims were rooted in the fact that S “did not know that [he] read at a third-grade level. Defendant contends that this was significant because, without this knowledge, [S] could not have made ‘special efforts to ensure’ that [he] understood the things that [S] discussed with him.” The court found that this claim suffered “from a glaring problem—it conflates defendant’s ability to read with his ability to comprehend concepts that are explained to him. While [he] testified that he had difficulty reading, he never testified that he had problems with comprehension in general. Nor is there any evidence suggesting that [his] struggles with reading were rooted in an intellectual disability that required a special accommodation like having things to be explained to him in simple terms.” And nothing in the record suggested he “ever communicated to [S] that he did not understand what it meant to waive his right to a jury trial or that he was unsure what he was giving up by doing so. Given this, it is unclear how [S] was supposed to know about defendant’s purported lack of understanding. This is especially true considering [S’s] testimony at the Ginther hearing that there was ‘[n]o question’ in his mind that, following his conversations with [him], defendant understood the difference between a bench trial and a jury trial when he decided to waive his right to a jury trial.” The court also found that it was reasonable for the trial court to infer from the evidence that defendant lived at the house, or at least resided there sometimes in the “only bedroom. And given the large amount of controlled substances and the number of firearms” discovered scattered around the “house—including in plain view on a table alongside packaging material—it was reasonable” to infer that the person residing in the “bedroom knew of the items in the house and exercised control over them.” Affirmed but remanded for correction of the JOS.