e-Journal Summary

e-Journal Number : 85021
Opinion Date : 01/13/2026
e-Journal Date : 01/26/2026
Court : Michigan Court of Appeals
Case Name : McClory v. McClory
Practice Area(s) : Family Law
Judge(s) : Per Curiam – Boonstra, O’Brien, and Young
Full PDF Opinion
Issues:

Divorce; Supervised parenting time; MCL 722.27(1)(b); MCL 722.27a; MCL 722.27a(8); Discovery sanction; Judgment of divorce (JOD)

Summary

The court affirmed the JOD entered by the trial court insofar as it granted defendant-ex-husband supervised parenting time with the two children. Also, the trial court did not err by preventing him from cross-examining plaintiff-ex-wife’s witnesses at trial. He argued that the trial court erred by “granting him parenting time without specifying the days and times for the parenting time.” The court disagreed. The trial court properly granted his “parenting time in general terms under MCL 722.27(1)(b), when it ordered supervised parenting time at the agency and defendant failed to request parenting time in specific terms as required under MCL 722.27a(8).” He incorrectly argued “that the parenting time provision in the [JOD] must be reversed because it failed to specify the days and times for his parenting time. Under MCL 722.27(1)(b), the circuit court may ‘[p]rovide for reasonable parenting time of the child by the parties involved . . . by general or specific terms and conditions.’ MCL 722.27(1)(b) then states that parenting time of a child by the parents is governed by MCL 722.27a.” Under MCL 722.27a(8), “‘[p]arenting time shall be granted in specific terms if requested by either party at any time.’ Read together, the statutes’ plain and ordinary meanings clearly establish that the trial court may grant a party parenting time in general or specific terms. However, if a parent requests parenting time in specific terms, the trial court must grant parenting time accordingly.” The court noted that “the trial court granted defendant parenting time in general terms by allowing him supervised parenting time at the agency without specifying the days and times for such visitation. Defendant never asked the trial court to specify the days and times for such visits as is required under MCL 722.27a(8). Therefore, because MCL 722.27(1)(b) clearly allowed the trial court to grant defendant parenting time in general terms, there was nothing improper with the parenting time provision in the” JOD.

Full PDF Opinion