Termination under §§ (a)(i), (g), & (j); Reasonable reunification efforts; In re Hicks/Brown; Exceptions to reasonable efforts; MCL 712A.19a(2); In re Walters; Prior sibling terminations; MCL 712A.19a(2)(c); In re Atchley; Aggravated circumstances; In re Barber/Espinoza; “Abuse”; MCL 722.622(g); In re Simonetta

The court held that the trial court erred by terminating parental rights at the initial disposition without first finding that an exception to reasonable reunification efforts applied, so it vacated the termination order and remanded. The trial court authorized a petition seeking termination at initial disposition after respondent-mother was “noncompliant with every aspect of her case service plan,” was homeless, left the newborn with the maternal grandmother, and had no contact with the child thereafter. On appeal, the court held that “[g]enerally, ‘[the DHHS] has an affirmative duty to make reasonable efforts to reunify a family before seeking termination of parental rights,’” and that “MCL 712A.19a(2) contains an exclusive list of the exceptions” and “[u]nder no circumstances may a trial court terminate a parent’s rights without first finding that one of these exceptions applies.” It concluded the trial court’s apparent reliance on MCL 712A.19a(2)(c) was legally and factually unsupported because “it is undisputed that respondent’s parental rights to her other children had not been terminated at the time her rights to [the child] were terminated,” so the finding of “four previous terminations” was erroneous. The court also held the record could not support excusing services under MCL 712A.19a(2)(a) because the trial court “never made any findings of abuse,” and under MCL 722.638(1)(a) aggravated circumstances require abuse that “included” one of the listed circumstances such as “(i) Abandonment of a young child.” It emphasized that “child abuse perpetrated by a listed individual is not independently sufficient” and “must also have ‘included’ certain circumstances,” and here the trial court did not find that leaving the child with the maternal grandmother constituted “abuse including abandonment,” nor did it make “a factual finding based on clear and convincing evidence that aggravated circumstances exist.” The court therefore vacated and remanded for the trial court to “either order that the petitioner provide reasonable services to the respondent, or articulate a factual finding based on clear and convincing evidence that aggravated circumstances exist such that services are not required.”