Whether the Michigan Regulation & Taxation of Marijuana Act (MRTMA) implicitly repealed the keeping-or-maintaining-a-drug-house statute (MCL 333.7405(1)(d)); MCL 333.27955, 333.27954(i) & 333.27965(2); Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to request a jury instruction on the MRTMA & to move to suppress the search warrant; Futile objection

Holding that MCL 333.7405(1)(d) did “not conflict with the MRTMA in this case” and rejecting defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the court affirmed. He was convicted of keeping or maintaining a drug house, second offense. He argued that the conviction was “invalid because the MRTMA implicitly repealed the keeping-or-maintaining-a-drug-house statute because the provisions cannot be read in harmony.” The court disagreed. It considered three sections of the MRTMA - MCL 333.27955 (section 5), 333.27954(i) (section 4), and 333.27965(2) (section 15). Defendant argued “that, because he violated section 5 by having more than 10, but less than 20, ounces of marijuana, section 15 provides the exclusive punishment for his actions to be a civil infraction. But defendant neglects the first part of section 15, which explains that the subsequent civil infraction punishments apply: ‘Except for a person who engaged in conduct described in section 4[.]’” Defendant here “was ‘engaged in conduct described in section 4’ because he had more than 2.5 ounces of marijuana in his home not ‘stored in a container or equipped with locks or other functioning security devices that restrict access to the contents of the container or area.’” The court noted that the marijuana was found in his “bedroom ‘laying on a pile of clothes[,]’ and defense counsel conceded that the drugs were not in a container. Accordingly, defendant’s possession of 15 ounces of marijuana did not fall within the protective scope of the MRTMA, meaning he was, indeed, ‘illegally keeping’ marijuana, a Schedule 1 controlled substance under MCL 333.7212(1)(c), in the home.” His claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request a MRTMA jury instruction was based on his “contention that the MRTMA protected him from being charged with keeping or maintaining a drug house.” Thus, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a futile request for such an instruction. The court also held that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a futile motion to suppress where sufficient probable cause supported the search warrant.