Elements of leaving the scene; MCL 257.617(2); People v Dumback; Admission of photographs; Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; People v Howard; Toxicology report; Rule of completeness; MRE 106; People v Clark; Lesser included offense instruction; MCL 257.617(1); People v Cornell; Prosecutorial error; People v Carines; Jury unanimity; People v Cooks; Ineffective assistance; People v Uphaus

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting injury photographs, excluding the victim’s toxicology report, or denying a lesser-offense instruction, and it found no reversible prosecutorial error, unanimity error, or ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant left a crash scene after his vehicle collided with a dirt bike. The jury convicted him of failing to stop at the scene of an accident causing serious impairment, with the record showing the victim suffered a traumatic brain injury, skull fracture, hematomas, and a prolonged coma. On appeal, the court held that the photographs were relevant to prove serious impairment and, although “gruesome,” were “not rendered inadmissible merely because it brings vividly to the jurors” the injuries. It rejected admission of the toxicology report under MRE 106 because the rule “has no bearing on the admissibility of the underlying evidence,” and fault or the victim’s recovery timeline was not an element the prosecutor had to prove. It also affirmed denial of a misdemeanor lesser-included instruction because defendant offered no evidence disputing serious injury and “fault” is not an element of MCL 257.617(2). The court next found no outcome-determinative prosecutorial error where the prosecutor began referencing a non-testifying officer, the trial court immediately stopped the argument and instructed the jury to disregard it, and jurors are presumed to follow instructions. It held no specific unanimity instruction was required because the statute provides alternative means, and “jury unanimity is not required with regard to the alternate theory.” Finally, it found counsel was not ineffective for declining to make futile motions and defendant did not show a reasonable probability of a different result. Affirmed.