Preliminary injunction factors; MCR 3.310(A)(4); Slis v Michigan; Likelihood of success; Housing Law claims; MCL 125.471; MCL 125.402(18); Public nuisance; Ypsilanti Charter Twp v Kircher; Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA); MCL 445.903(1); “Trade or commerce” (MCL 445.902(g)); Housing Law preemption; MCL 125.530(3); Municipal authority; MCL 125.408; MCL 125.534(8); Irreparable harm; Pontiac Fire Fighters Union Local 376 v Pontiac; Equity powers; Tkachik v Mandeville

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting a preliminary injunction addressing severe housing-code violations at an apartment complex owned by defendants because plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success, “irreparable harm” to health and safety, a favorable balance of harms, and alignment with the public interest. Plaintiffs alleged that “defendants continued to solicit prospective tenants,” execute leases, and “demand or collect rent” despite condemnation and revoked certificates of compliance, while the record reflected extensive conditions including “severe and unmitigated long-term infestation of vermin,” “water damage and mold growth,” “lack of working utilities,” “damaged and/or nonfunctioning smoke detectors,” loose or exposed wiring, and unauthorized occupancy. On appeal, the court applied the four-factor test for preliminary injunctions. As to likelihood of success, it agreed it was not “‘seriously debated that the properties had fallen into a state of disrepair,’” and the affidavits supported violations of the Housing Law and a public-nuisance theory. It also rejected defendants’ preemption argument against the MCPA/rent component, explaining the Housing Law permits municipalities to impose “‘requirements higher than the minimum requirements laid down in this act,’” and expressly provides it “‘does not preempt, preclude, or interfere with’” municipal authority to protect “‘health, safety, and general welfare[.]’” The court upheld the irreparable-harm finding because the “health conditions” posed imminent risks and “there is no adequate remedy at law” to address tenant safety, even if some relief had monetary aspects. It likewise upheld the public-interest determination that tenants should not be forced to live in apartments presenting “serious health risks,” and concluded the balance of harms favored plaintiffs because the risk to tenants’ health and welfare outweighed defendants’ “purely monetary harm[.]” Finally, it held that the trial court could “‘mold its decrees to do justice’” and adapt “‘its judgment[s] to the special circumstances,’” so the injunction was not invalid merely because it did not track a single statutory remedial provision. Affirmed.