Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); Reasonable reunification efforts; Modifications for respondent’s disabilities; Child’s best interests

Concluding that (1) § (c)(i) existed, (2) reasonable efforts were made to reunify respondent-father with child-MST, and (3) termination of his parental rights was in MST’s best interests, the court affirmed. As to § (c)(i), it found that “the conditions leading to the trial court taking jurisdiction had not meaningfully changed.” The court noted that a lack “of regular contact was one of the reasons the trial court assumed jurisdiction over MST, and respondent did not make a meaningful change in the frequency with which he saw MST.” It acknowledged that he “had resolved the situation of his unsuitable housing.” However, it noted that “the home still was unfit for MST because respondent had not demonstrated that he would be able to care for MST. He was not aware of her special needs and actively denied that MST had any mental health issues. Respondent worked full-time and did not have a plan in place for caring for MST if she was returned to his care. He did not benefit from his service plan, which required, in part, parenting time and parenting classes.” Also, he “did not consistently attend his parenting times.” The court held that there “was no evidence that respondent would begin seeing MST more frequently or be more equipped to parent her in a reasonable amount of time, especially given the minimal progress he had made in approximately 19 months.” Also, reasonable “efforts were made to reunify respondent with MST.” He minimally “complied with his service plan and did not benefit.” Respondent argued “that reasonable efforts were not made to reunify him with MST because his service plan was not modified for his disabilities.” The court noted that the “foster-care worker acknowledged early in this case that respondent likely had cognitive impairments, memory issues, and other mental health problems. However, she also stated that to provide specialized services, such as parenting classes aimed at people with developmental disabilities, respondent needed a formal diagnosis.” He was “referred six times for a psychological evaluation that could provide a diagnosis. He did not complete the evaluation until after statutory grounds were found to terminate his parental rights. Respondent also denied having any disabilities or special needs.” He did not claim “that there were available programs that did not require a formal diagnosis. Although the foster care worker could not refer [him] to more specialized services, she modified standard procedures to communicate with [him] about his service plan via phone call, text message, and letters.” The court concluded that because “modifications were made to better communicate with respondent, he largely refused to obtain a formal diagnosis, and he did not identify any services that would have led to a better outcome, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that reasonable efforts were made to reunify respondent with MST.”