Sufficiency of the evidence; Second-degree murder elements; People v Gafken; Self-defense burden shifting; People v Dupree; MCL 780.972(1)(a); Malice; People v Dykhouse; Voluntary manslaughter; People v Mendoza; Sentence proportionality; People v Posey; Within-guidelines presumption; People v Burkett; Juvenile record consideration; MCL 777.50(1); People v Smith

The court held that 1) sufficient evidence supported second-degree murder because the prosecution disproved self-defense and proved malice, and 2) the within-guidelines 20-year minimum sentence was proportionate, including the trial court’s consideration of defendant’s juvenile history. Defendant shot the victim multiple times after an early-morning street argument, fled, and later told his sister’s boyfriend (P) that he shot and killed “somebody” because the person “disrespected” him and that he threw the gun into the Detroit River. At trial, defendant claimed self-defense, testifying the victim choked him and triggered an asthma attack, but the court held a rational jury could reject that claim because P did not see injuries, defendant did not mention choking when he confessed, defendant fled and disposed of the gun, and he later told P he would “kill” him after P cooperated with police. The court concluded this evidence supported a finding defendant did not “honestly and reasonably” believe deadly force was necessary under MCL 780.972(1)(a). The court also held malice was proven because defendant fired about six shots, including evidence of a delay between the last two shots, and P’s testimony supported an intent to kill or cause great bodily harm. It rejected voluntary manslaughter because defendant’s theory depended on accepting his testimony, which the jury did not. As to sentencing, the court held the 20-year minimum for second-degree murder, at the top of the 12-to-20-year guidelines range, was presumed proportionate and defendant showed no “unusual circumstances” to rebut that presumption. It also held the trial court did not violate the 10-year gap rule because the guidelines were not scored using stale juvenile adjudications, and the court could still consider juvenile history as a factor “not accounted for by the sentencing guidelines.” Affirmed.