The General Property Tax Act; Qualified Agricultural Exemption (QAE); MCL 211.7ee; Whether the Tax Tribunal (TT) had subject-matter jurisdiction; Sixarp, LLC v Byron Twp; MCL 205.735a(5); Board of Review (BOR) authority to determine a claim of exemption; MCL 11.7ee(6); MCL 211.53b; MCL 205.762a; Notice; Procedural due process requirements; Distinguishing Geldhof Enters Inc v Department of Treasury (Unpub), Winkler v Markey Twp (Unpub), & Kemennu v Department of Treasury (Unpub)

Holding that the TT lacked jurisdiction to hear petitioners’ (collectively, LivWell) claim and that respondent-City’s notice did not violate due process guarantees, the court vacated the TT’s decision ruling that LivWell was entitled to a QAE under MCL 211.7ee. It found the TT correctly interpreted the relevant statutes, which are not “ambiguous. The [TT] correctly interpreted the plain language of MCL 205.735a(5) to give effect to the Legislature’s clear intent to divest the [TT] of jurisdiction when the proper [BOR] does not first hear the claim.” In addition, it “correctly interpreted the plain language of MCL 211.7ee(6) to give effect to the Legislature’s clear intent to require a taxpayer to appeal its denial of a QAE to the July [BOR] when the City assessed a summer tax levy.” But the TT went on to find that it “retained jurisdiction because the notice of appeal that the City sent to the taxpayer was ‘ineffective and misleading’ when it stated that the taxpayer could appeal ‘to either the July or December’” BOR. The court noted the TT “‘does not have jurisdiction over constitutional questions’ and lacks the authority to consider whether” a city and its BOR’s procedures “satisfy a taxpayer’s constitutional right to procedural due process.” The court held that the TT “lacked jurisdiction under MCL 205.735a(5) to hear a claim of appeal regarding the denial of a QAE request under MCL 211.7ee and erred by asserting jurisdiction instead of entering a dismissal.” The court also concluded that the City’s “notice satisfied procedural due process requirements.” The three unpublished opinions the TT relied on were distinguishable. The notice here “clearly notified LivWell of its right to appeal, as well as the timeframe for doing so. [It] informed LivWell that it could appeal its denial of the QAE ‘for the 2023 assessment year to the July or December [BOR] under MCL 211.7ee [sic].’ This language directs the reader to review MCL 211.7ee to determine whether appeal to the” 7/23 or 12/23 BOR was appropriate. And “MCL 211.7ee(6) clearly explains that a petitioner must appeal its denial of a QAE to the July [BOR] when the City assessed a summer tax levy.” The court also found persuasive the City’s argument “that it would be nearly impossible to tailor all notices to all tax petitioners. Form notices are far more efficient, provided that” they comport with due process. The court found that the one here did so.