Termination under § 19b(3)(k)(ix); The doctrine of anticipatory neglect; Alleged deficiencies in petition; Aggravated circumstances; MCL 722.638(1)(a)(ii)

Concluding that (1) § (k)(ix) existed to terminate respondent-father’s parental rights to the children (ES and PS), and (2) “the petition adequately identified aggravated circumstances for purposes of MCL 722.638(1)(a)(ii)—i.e., criminal sexual conduct involving penetration of the children’s sibling, KRF[,]” the court affirmed. Respondent did “not contest the accuracy of the exhibits on which the trial court relied, nor that he sexually abused KRF.” Instead, he claimed “the evidence did not demonstrate a risk of harm to PS and ES if returned to his care, emphasizing the differences between KRF and his children.” Though respondent did “not identify it by name, this argument implicates the doctrine of anticipatory neglect[.]” As an initial matter, his argument suggested that the only risk of harm contemplated by § (k)(ix) “is a physical one of the type inflicted on the sibling— here, sexual abuse. But the statute contains no such limiting language.” The court saw “no reason that the harm contemplated under [§ (k)] would not likewise include emotional harm. With this understanding, the record evidence demonstrates a risk of harm to PS and ES if returned to respondent’s care.” Not only did he “sexually abuse his children’s half-sibling, he did so while one of his children slept in the same room, and the rest of the family slept in the same apartment.” The court found respondent failed “to explain how the trial court’s conclusion that this behavior risked emotional or physical harm to ES or PS was clearly erroneous.” His plain disregard for the children’s well-being, “both of whom resided in the same household and one of whom was in close physical proximity to the sexual abuse when it occurred, supports use of the presumption of anticipatory neglect in this case.” Also, the court disagreed that “the underlying petition did not adequately set forth aggravating circumstances allowing DHHS to seek termination at the initial disposition.” It contained specific allegations as to “respondent’s sexual penetration of KRF[.]”