As-applied constitutional challenge to the FIP statute (18 USC § 922(g)(1)); The Second Amendment; New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v Bruen; District of Columbia v Heller; United States v Williams; Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the district court’s “dangerousness” determination for purposes of § 922(g)(1)

In an issue of first impression in this circuit, the court considered whether the “dangerousness” inquiries for pretrial detention and taking away a felon’s right to possess a firearm under § 922(g)(1) “are one and the same” and held that they are different. It also held that the district court properly determined that defendant-Taylor “was dangerous based on his prior felony drug trafficking convictions.” He moved to have his indictment for FIP dismissed on Second Amendment grounds. When the district court denied his motion, he pled guilty, reserving his right to appeal. He brought an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1). The court first reviewed Second Amendment case law, including Williams, where it held that “‘governments may use class-based legislation to disarm people it believes are dangerous, so long as members of that class have an opportunity to show they [are not].’” Taylor argued that he could not be considered “dangerous” under Williams where the district court apparently determined he was not dangerous when it granted him pretrial release. The court noted that the two inquiries implicate “different liberty interests” as well as “different legal presumptions: a presumption runs against pretrial detention for most crimes, . . . but under § 922(g)(1), a presumption runs in favor of restricting felons’ access to firearms.” Thus, the district court’s dangerousness assessment for pretrial detention purposes “does not automatically resolve” whether a defendant is dangerous for § 922(g)(1) purposes, it concluded that the district court’s allowing “Taylor to remain on bail pending sentencing and to self-surrender speaks to [his] ability to obey the conditions set by the court, not his alleged lack of dangerousness.” Turning to the dangerousness inquiry for § 922(g)(1) purposes, the court applied Williams, looking at his offense conduct and then his criminal history. As to the former, while under the influence of meth, he “began hallucinating and claimed to ‘see[] people watching him that others can’t see.’ Holes from four shots were then found inside his townhouse.” As to the latter, his “felony drug trafficking convictions fall within the second Williams category.” While he asserted he “is a ‘nonviolent felon,’” the court noted that “Williams does not require violence to show dangerousness.” Further, the age of his convictions did not preclude a dangerousness finding. Affirmed.