§ 19b(3)(d), therapist expert testimony

§ 19b(3)(d); Expert testimony from a therapist; MRE 702; Surman v Surman; Lay opinion testimony; MRE 701; Adjudication; Exercise of jurisdiction; MCL 712A.2(b)(4)

The court held that the trial court (1) did not abuse its discretion in allowing the child’s (IG) therapist (M) to testify as an expert, (2) properly exercised jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(4), and (3) did not clearly err in terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights under § (d). Respondent argued that because M had not “previously testified as an expert witness, she was not qualified to testify regarding her therapy sessions with IG. However, the mere fact that [M] had not previously testified as an expert did not disqualify her from testifying, because a witness ‘may be qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education[.]’” The record showed that she “had been working in the social work field for 15 years and was a licensed play therapist supervisor who had been specializing in children’s therapy for the past six years. [M] had a master’s degree in social work, a bachelor’s degree in family life education, and an associate’s degree in early childhood development.” The court concluded that given her “knowledge, skills, experience, training, and education in the area of child therapy, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing her to testify as an expert witness, under MRE 702, in the area of child therapy.” FurIher, even if it had, any error was harmless because her testimony would have been admissible under MRE 701; As to the trial court’s decision to exercise jurisdiction, it “did not clearly err by finding that respondent had substantially failed to comply with the limited-guardianship plan.” In regard to the termination of her parental rights under § (d), the court held that “the trial court did not clearly err by determining, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent ‘substantially failed, without good cause, to comply with a limited guardianship placement plan.’” It also did not clearly err in finding that her “noncompliance disrupted her relationship with IG. The record showed that [she] had not bonded with IG before her incarceration and that IG suffered extensive trauma from having contact with respondent in prison[.]” By the end of the adjudication trial, they “had not had contact in nearly four years . . . and IG suffered from severe anxiety at the thought of reuniting with respondent.” Affirmed.