Habeas corpus; The Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA) one-year statute of limitations; 28 USC § 2244(d)(1)(A); Whether defendant’s postconviction motion tolled the statute; Applicability of the “prison-mailbox rule” under MCR 1.112; Whether the court rule applies retroactively; Whether the motion was timely deposited in the prison mailbox; Filing dates under the MCRs; MI Sup Ct IOP 7.202(4)-1; MCR 6.503(A); Equitable tolling; Whether the petition would have succeeded on the merits; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Strickland v Washington

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court reversed petitioner-Borns’s conditional grant of habeas corpus, holding that his petition was untimely under the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations, and that the statute was not tolled by his postconviction motion. Borns was convicted in Michigan state court of AWIM and illegally possessing a gun, and his appellate efforts failed. He filed for habeas relief, arguing, among other things, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and call certain witnesses and for failing to raise issues on appeal. The district court rejected the government’s argument that the petition was time-barred under the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations and granted Borns a conditional writ. There was no question that his petition fell outside the limitations period, but Borns argued that the postconviction motion he filed in state court tolled the statute. The parties disputed when this motion was filed. The court looked to Michigan law and held that the current “prison-mailbox” rule did not apply where he filed his motion before the current court rule took effect. His claim that the rule should be applied retroactively failed where Michigan requires a “clear intent” for retroactive application and “the rule’s text says nothing about retroactivity.” The court also held that his attempt to invoke the earlier appellate prison-mailbox rule was futile as that rule did not cover postconviction motions. Further, even if the prison-mailbox rule applied, he failed to show that he timely deposited the motion in the mailbox, instead relying on his signature date. Where the prison-mailbox rule does not apply, “the Michigan Supreme Court considers a document ‘filed’ ‘only when it is received by the Clerk’s Office in Lansing.’” Here, the motion was received outside the time limit. The court declined to apply equitable tolling, and further found that even if the petition had been timely, it would not have succeeded on the merits where Borns’s trial counsel was not deficient under Strickland’s deferential standard.