Sentencing; Reduction for “acceptance of responsibility” (USSG § 3E1.1(a)); Restitution for victims’ mental health treatment; 18 USC § 3663(b)(2)(A); “Bodily injury”; A mental harm that produces physical symptoms; Procedural & substantive reasonableness; Aggravating role enhancement (§ 3B1.1(c)); Obstruction of justice enhancement (§ 3C1.1)

The court held that “bodily injury” in the restitution statute (§ 3663) “does not encompass purely mental or psychological harms.” However, when “a victim suffers a mental harm that produces physical symptoms, the victim experiences ‘bodily injury’” under § 3663. It also found that the district court did not err in denying defendant-Green an acceptance of responsibility reduction. And it rejected defendant-Hovanec’s procedural and substantive reasonableness challenges to her sentences, as well as her arguments related to the §§ 3B1.1(c) and 3C1.1 enhancements. Hovanec killed her husband by injecting him with an animal tranquilizer. Her mother, Green, drove the car to bury the body. Hovanec pled guilty to conspiracy to import a controlled substance, importation of a controlled substance, conspiracy to possess a controlled substance with intent to distribute, and distribution of a controlled substance. She was sentenced to 480 months. Green pled guilty to being an accessory after the fact. She was sentenced to 121 months and ordered to pay for her grandchildren’s psychological care as restitution. On appeal, the court first upheld the denial of a sentence reduction for acceptance of responsibility because evidence showed Green “was dishonest during the change-of-plea hearing[,]” and there was no indication the district court had “misinterpreted” her statements regarding prior knowledge of the murder plan. Her guilty plea and proffer did “not entitle her to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility given that she falsely denied relevant conduct.” Green also challenged the restitution order, arguing that there was no “bodily injury” to her grandchildren. The district court ruled that “bodily injury” includes mental harm. The statute does not define the term, so the court considered dictionary definitions. These definitions showed “that ‘bodily injury’ is defined as a physical or corporeal injury and contrasted with mental or spiritual injuries.” And they were “in accord with the conclusions of all of our sibling circuits that have addressed the question de novo.” Thus, it “concluded that ‘bodily injury’ does not include purely mental harms[.]” But it also held that the term “encompasses physical manifestations of mental harms.” Because it was not clear from the record whether the children’s mental harm resulted in physical symptoms, the court remanded for the district court to make a “factual determination of whether the children’s mental harm from Green’s crime manifested physically[.]” All of Hovanec’s sentencing challenges failed. The court affirmed defendants’ sentences, reversed Green’s restitution order, and remanded as to the restitution issue.