Speedy trial; Barker v Wingo factors; Length of the delay; Reason for the delay; Assertion of the right; Prejudice; Sufficiency of the evidence for a CSC I conviction under MCL 750.520b(1)(f); “Personal injury”; Prosecutorial misconduct; Officer’s testimony as to his prior contact with defendant; Expert testimony; Bolstering or vouching; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to make a futile objection; Flight instruction; Consecutive sentences; MCL 750.520b(3)

Finding no errors warranting reversal, the court affirmed defendant’s CSC I convictions and sentences, as a second-offense habitual offender, to consecutive terms of 262 to 480 months (21¾ to 40 years) for each count. He argued, among other things, “that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated, and he was prejudiced by the five-year delay from the time of his arrest to the time that trial began.” The first Barker factor was undisputed. Trial commenced nearly five years after he was arrested and arraigned. As to the second Barker factor, the court held that examining “each period of the 55½-month delay, 20 months are attributable to defendant, 24½ months are attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic, and 11 months are neutral and thus assigned minimal weight.” When considered together, there was “no evidence that the prosecution is substantially to blame for the delays in this case.” As to the third Barker factor, it weighed in defendant’s favor. In 6/21, he “moved for dismissal alleging speedy-trial and 180-day violations. The trial court acknowledged that the 180-day deadline had passed but denied the motion because jury trials were on hold during the COVID-19 pandemic and the matter was scheduled for trial.” On 7/7/23, he “again moved for dismissal alleging speedy-trial and 180-day violations. The trial court found that most of the adjournments were during the COVID-19 pandemic and there were further delays because of defendant’s transfer to and conviction in Alabama. [His] motion was denied.” As to the final factor, the court held that because “the delay between defendant’s arrest and trial was more than 18 months, prejudice” was presumed. It concluded that while “there was a 55½-month delay, there is no evidence that the prosecution is substantially to blame for the delays in this case. The prosecution also overcame the presumption of prejudice by showing that defendant’s defense was not hindered by the delay. Balancing all the relevant factors,” he did not establish “a violation of his right to a speedy trial.” Defendant next asserted “that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that” the victim (M M-H) suffered a personal injury as required for his convictions under MCL 750.520b(1)(f). The court held that “there was sufficient evidence to allow a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that M M-H experienced mental anguish.” The evidence of her “mental anguish was sufficient to establish the personal injury requirement[.]”