Prosecutorial misconduct; Closing argument statements; People v Bahoda; Effect of the jury instructions; People v Stanaway; Plain error review

The court held that the prosecutor’s challenged closing argument “remarks, viewed in context, did not constitute plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights and did not deprive [him] of a fair trial.” He was convicted of CSC IV. He argued “that the prosecutor made prejudicial remarks by referring to defendant’s conduct as ‘weird.’” The court determined that, read in context, the challenged “statements described defendant’s conduct, not his character. The prosecutor used the word ‘weird’ to characterize defendant’s actions in asking a minor to breakfast, not to denigrate [him] personally. Viewed as a whole, the remarks focused on specific conduct relevant to the charged offense. The prosecutor similarly described defendant’s conduct during the massage as ‘not normal behavior’ and ‘bizarre’ while arguing that the touching was for a sexual purpose[.]” The court noted that to establish CSC IV, “the prosecutor was required to argue that the touching was for a sexual purpose. . . . In doing so, the prosecutor permissibly described defendant’s conduct and argued reasonable inferences from the evidence. The remarks did not amount to personal attacks or improper character assassination and therefore did not deprive defendant of a fair trial.” Defendant also asserted “that the prosecutor improperly expressed a personal opinion by stating, ‘I don’t take teenagers to breakfast. It’s weird.’” The court concluded this remark “did not imply special knowledge or assert defendant’s guilt. Rather, it was rhetorical commentary offered to support an inference drawn from the evidence. Accordingly, the statement did not constitute prosecutorial error.” Lastly, defendant argued that the prosecutor improperly bolstered the victim's (LP) “testimony by referencing its consistency with statements LP made to” a police officer. The court found that “the challenged remarks were based on evidence presented at trial.” Further, even assuming “the prosecutor alluded to ‘some special knowledge’ concerning LP’s truthfulness, . . . or otherwise mischaracterized LP’s testimony regarding consistency, any prejudice was cured by the trial court’s instructions.” Affirmed.