Quiet title; Standing; Claim for value of improvements; MCR 3.411(F)(1) & (3); Privity; MCR 3.411(D)(1)

In this quiet title case, the court held that defendants-Detroit International Holdings and Koperfield Investments “have a legal cause of action under MCR 3.411(F)(1) for the value of improvements to the property.” It was undisputed that plaintiff-Toure “sought to quiet title to real property by bringing an action in circuit court, that he sufficiently described the land and the claimed interests of all parties, and that the trial court concluded that Toure held title to the property after considering the evidence.” Detroit International and Koperfield then “sought to bring a claim under MCR 3.411(F) for the value of improvements that they made to the property.” The trial court denied this “request, reasoning that it could not be maintained because they lacked privity of contract with Toure.” The court noted that “MCR 3.411(F)(1) has no language limiting a claim for improvements to individuals who are in privity of contract with the person who a court has found to have title to the premises. Instead, it requires that the person filing a claim for improvements be ‘a party.’” Detroit International and Koperfield were “parties to Toure’s quiet-title action. The court rule requires that their claim for improvements be brought against ‘the party found to have title to the premises.’ Toure is the party that the [trial] court found to have title. Given the plain language of MCR 3.411(F),” the court concluded the trial court erred in “denying Detroit International and Koperfield the opportunity to file their claim for improvements against Toure.” It noted the trial court suggested they could sue defendant-Davis. But “the court rule does not permit, nor does it require the claim for improvements to be brought against a party’s immediate predecessor in interest. Thus, the [trial] court’s contention that the claim could and should be maintained against Davis is also contrary to the plain language of the court rule. Likewise, [its] suggestion that a claim could only be maintained if Detroit International and Koperfield had any title or interest in the property is also erroneous inasmuch as the court rule expressly contemplates that someone without title may claim the value of improvements made to the property.” Toure contended that their claim was “nevertheless barred under MCR 3.411(F)(3)[.]” The court held that whether they “made the improvements to the property in bad faith . . . is irrelevant to a determination of whether they may bring a claim under MCR 3.411(F)(1). Here, it was determined that Davis forged the deed with the aid of a notary.” Nothing in the record suggested “that Detroit International and Koperfield were aware that Davis’s claim to the property was based upon a forged deed. Nor is there any evidence that they were aware, at the time that they made the improvements, that there was a cloud upon their title to the property. In the absence of any evidence of bad faith, it is premature to preclude their claim” based on MCR 3.411(F)(3). Reversed and remanded.