Sufficiency of the evidence for a second-degree child abuse conviction; MCL 750.136b(3)(c); Cruelty element; Effect of an acquittal on an assault by strangulation charge (MCL 750.84(2)); Lack of physical injury

Holding that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s second-degree child abuse conviction, the court affirmed. It concluded that, viewed “in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence that defendant struck the victim, choked her, destroyed household property in anger, and threatened to turn the house into a crime scene was sufficient for a rational jury to conclude that [he] committed a cruel act toward the victim that was not reasonable discipline.” While there were inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony “and her credibility was challenged at trial, issues of credibility and the weight of the evidence are for the jury to decide, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in support of the verdict.” The court noted that a “witness’s testimony is not rendered wholly unbelievable merely because it is inconsistent or questionable in some respects.” It rejected defendant’s argument that there was insufficient evidence of the cruelty element because the jury acquitted him of an assault by strangulation charge and the victim did not sustain physical injury. That charge “requires proof that the defendant ‘imped[ed] normal breathing or circulation of the blood.’” However, physical harm is not required for a conviction of second-degree child abuse under MCL 750.136b(3)(c). “The jury’s acquittal on the strangulation charge reflects only that it was not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant impeded the victim’s breathing or circulation, not that [he] did not choke the victim or act cruelly toward her.”