Whether the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof; Children’s best interests; Request for an adjournment to subpoena witnesses; MCR 3.923(G); MCR 2.503(C)(2); Good cause; Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to subpoena witnesses

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying respondent-mother’s request for an adjournment to subpoena witnesses, and her related ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed. The trial court also did not improperly shift the burden to her to prove her sobriety, or clearly err in finding that terminating her parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Thus, the court affirmed the termination order. As to the denial of an adjournment, the court concluded respondent “failed to establish good cause. She provided no affidavits, witness lists, or proffer demonstrating that the proposed testimony was material or outcome-determinative. Nor did she show diligent efforts to secure the witnesses. [She] did not identify when she allegedly provided witness information to prior counsel, whether she followed up on those efforts, or why no witness list was filed.” And without an offer of proof about “the substance of the proposed witnesses’ testimony or how it would have affected the outcome[,]” she could not “overcome the presumption of effective assistance. Even assuming deficient performance, respondent failed to establish prejudice given the extensive evidence of unresolved substance abuse, lack of progress despite prolonged services, and ongoing concerns regarding parenting ability.” The court also determined that, viewed as a whole, the record showed “the trial court did not place the burden of proof on respondent.” In reaching its decision, “the trial court relied on evidence presented by [DHHS], including testimony from a foster-care worker and a foster-care case manager regarding respondent’s continued substance-abuse concerns, lack of progress, and unresolved barriers to reunification. [It] also detailed the numerous services offered to [her] and explained why [they] had not resulted in meaningful improvement. Nothing in [its] findings suggests that termination was ordered because respondent failed to prove her fitness.” Finally, as to the children’s best interests, the trial court found that she did not have a meaningful bond with them “and that given their young ages, they required permanency and stability. [It] further noted a high likelihood that [they] would be adopted by their fictive-kin placement, which would allow them to remain together as siblings.”