Promissory estoppel & unjust enrichment claims; Cove Creek Condo Ass’n v Vistal Land & Home Dev, LLC; Bellevue Ventures, Inc v Morang-Kelly Inv; Whether the claims were actually tortious negligence claims; Applicability of the Government Tort Liability Act (GTLA); Genuine issue of material fact; Department of Public Works (DPW)

The court held that plaintiff’s promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment claims sounded in contract, not tort and thus, they did not fall within the scope of the immunity granted by the GTLA. Further, genuine issues of material fact precluded summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Thus, it affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant-City’s summary disposition motion. The “case arose from plaintiff’s 2021 purchase of a dump truck for the City’s use while he was employed” as its DPW Director. He testified that the Mayor assured him “that the City would reimburse him if he purchased the” truck so he went to an “auction house with a cashier’s check from his credit union, purchased the truck, signed the title directly over to the City, and drove the truck to work for future use. [He] also immediately delivered the truck’s title to the City’s Director of Finance, who then added the truck to the City’s insurance policy.” Plaintiff also testified that he later left his position with the City “without having been reimbursed.” The City argued that the substance of his promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment “claims actually constituted claims of tortious negligence” and thus, it had immunity under the GTLA. The court held that the City could not avail itself of that immunity here. The City did not offer anything “to explain how the substance of” the unjust enrichment claim actually constituted a negligence claim. It also largely failed to explain this as to the promissory estoppel “claim, asserting only that plaintiff, when alleging promissory estoppel in his complaint, used the phrase ‘as a direct and proximate result,’ which is language typically associated with a negligence claim. But” it failed to show (and the court failed to see) “how the mere use of such language, alone, would somehow transform” the claim into a negligence claim, “particularly in light of the other language used throughout the complaint.” The court also held that, at minimum, plaintiff’s proffered evidence was sufficient to show a genuine issue of material fact existed “as to whether [he] reasonably relied on a promise of reimbursement from the Mayor in purchasing the 2008 truck for the City’s use.” Likewise, it failed to see how his “proofs were insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the City was unjustly enriched by its retention of the 2008 truck” he purchased.