Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to move for directed verdict; Motion to substitute counsel; Good cause; Sentencing; MCL 769.34(4)(a) (intermediate sanction); Attorney fees; MCR 6.005(C); People v Jackson

Concluding that defendant did not show any errors with the conviction, sentencing, or assessment of attorney fees, the court affirmed. When he arrived on the scene to pick up the child of a woman who was being arrested for an outstanding warrant during a traffic stop, “officers attempted to arrest [him] because [he] also had outstanding warrants, resulting in a struggle between officers and defendant. He was” convicted of resisting a police officer and sentenced to 45 days in jail and 24 months of probation. He first argued “that defense counsel should have moved for a directed verdict based on the prosecutor’s failure to introduce the arrest warrants and failure to prove that defendant’s arrest was lawful.” The court noted that at “trial, the prosecutor presented testimonial evidence that the officer had reasonable cause to arrest defendant. The arresting officer testified that he relied on the LEIN system and its information that defendant had outstanding warrants when arresting defendant. Looking at this evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecutor, a rational trier of fact could find that the element of lawful action for a resisting an officer charge was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. And in fact, the jury in this case did find the element met, evidenced by the guilty verdict.” Thus, defendant did not prove “either prong for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim because a motion for a directed verdict by defense counsel would have been meritless.” He next argued “that the trial court erred by denying his request for a new attorney.” He essentially argued “that there was good cause for substitution because of counsel’s refusal to file a motion to suppress evidence, misunderstanding of defendant’s bond, and insufficient trial preparation as a result of too few meetings.” It noted that whether to move to suppress is a matter of trial strategy, and whether “trial counsel understood defendant’s bond does not reflect counsel’s ability to represent [him] at trial.” Further, while “defense counsel only met with [him] twice before trial, this does not show a sufficient lack of diligence or interest to constitute good cause.” As to his sentence, the court held that the trial court did not err in sentencing him to 45 days in jail. His “minimum sentence on the sentencing range was less than 18 months, which” made MCL 769.34(4)(a) applicable. The court found that the “trial court provided reasonable grounds for its departure on the record, reasoning that defendant’s altercation with police lasted a significant period and demonstrated a lack of respect for the officers. Therefore, [it] articulated its justification for the upward departure in a manner that sufficiently explained the proportionality of defendant’s sentence.” The court held that “the trial court did not clearly err by sentencing [him] to a term of incarceration in jail rather than an intermediate sanction.”