Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i) & (j); In re Williams; In re White; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object to a witness being qualified as an expert & to investigate evidence; Factual predicate

Holding that termination was proper under §§ (c)(i) and (j), and rejecting respondent-mother’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the court affirmed the order terminating her parental rights. There was no dispute the children had been out of her “care for significantly longer than 182 days. And the record clearly supported the trial court’s determination that barriers continued to exist to reunification, including domestic violence and housing stability.” The court acknowledged “that ‘it would be impermissible for a parent’s parental rights to be terminated solely because he or she was a victim of domestic violence.’” But the trial court in this case properly terminated respondent’s “parental rights on the basis of [her] actions that harmed the children or exposed them to harm.” The court noted that she “was dishonest about her relationship with” a man (B) who one of the children disclosed had thrown her across the room, and the other child reported that B “‘tried to put lava in her, and [respondent-mother] didn’t help.’ The children were indisputably afraid of” B. Respondent never showed “that she fully understood what the children had experienced or the risks to which she had exposed them.” The court also noted that their therapist (H) “and the foster parents sought court protection because they feared” respondent’s conduct. In addition, respondent “repeatedly moved and changed jobs during the proceedings and relocated again shortly before the termination hearing. As a result, domestic violence and housing instability continued to impede reunification.” In light of the fact the children had been out of respondent’s “care for nearly five years by the time of the termination hearing, there was no reasonable likelihood that [she] would be able to rectify the concerns in a reasonable time considering” their ages. Thus, the trial court did not err in terminating her rights based on § (c)(i). And termination under § (j) was proper for many of the same reasons. As to her ineffective assistance claims, the court concluded that even “if it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness to fail to object” to H being qualified as an expert, respondent did not establish “that the trial court would or should have excluded [H’s] expert testimony or that [H’s] expert testimony prejudiced the outcome of the proceedings.”