Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); Children’s best interests; In re Olive/Metts; Reasonable reunification efforts; A parent’s “commensurate responsibility” to participate in & benefit from services; Advice of appellate rights after removal; MCR 3.965(B)(15); In re Barber/Espinoza

The court held that clear and convincing evidence supported termination because the conditions leading to adjudication continued to exist and were not reasonably likely to be rectified within a reasonable time, and that termination served the children’s best interests. The children were first removed from respondent-mother’s care because of meth use and domestic violence. They were later returned after services, and then were removed again within a year after respondent relapsed, engaged in ongoing domestic-violence dynamics with partners, self-harmed during a conflict that required stitches, and continued unsafe contact patterns that destabilized the home. The trial court terminated parental rights after hearing testimony from foster-care workers, a parenting-time supervisor, school and medical witnesses, and the foster mother about lack of benefit from services and deteriorations in the children’s behavior tied to contact with respondent. On appeal, the court affirmed under § (c)(i), emphasizing that more than 182 days had elapsed, that respondent had participated in services yet “did not benefit from them,” and that she failed to remedy domestic-violence and mental-health conditions, including by remaining in contact with abusive partners, failing to follow safety plans, and minimizing or denying the children’s reported exposure to violence and self-harm. The court noted that the DHHS must make reasonable efforts but the parent has a “commensurate responsibility” to participate and show benefit. It concluded the record supported that respondent “failed to rectify” her mental-health and domestic-violence issues and lacked a reasonable likelihood of doing so. The court also affirmed the best-interests finding because the children’s trauma-related needs required “permanency, stability, and finality,” multiple witnesses described the children’s improved behavior and emotional health when contact ended, and the foster parents consistently secured “necessary services” and safety that respondent had allowed to lapse. Finally, the court held the trial court erred by not advising respondent of the right to appeal the first removal under MCR 3.965(B)(15), but it found no prejudice because the proceedings later included proper advice at the second removal and termination resulted from her subsequent relapse, self-harm, and continued unsafe domestic-violence circumstances rather than the earlier notice defect.