Auto negligence; Causation; Proximate cause; Remoteness; Ray v Swager; Comparing Deaton by Deaton v Baker & Derbeck v Ward; Distinguishing Dillon v Tamminga & Davis v Thornton

The court held that defendant’s negligence in causing the initial collision was not a proximate cause of plaintiff’s later crash as a matter of law because the connection between the two events was too attenuated for reasonable minds to differ. Defendant allegedly lost control while intoxicated and caused a three-car crash around 6:30 p.m. on 1/1/23, after which police parked on the right shoulder with emergency lights so traffic slowed and merged left. Plaintiff pulled onto the left shoulder, waited about 9 to 10 minutes, then attempted to merge back into the left lane around 6:45 p.m. She was rear-ended by another driver who stated that cars were “changing lanes suddenly” away from the police activity and that plaintiff pulled out in front of her. Plaintiff sued defendant on the theory that his initial crash and the policing it required “proximately caused” her later collision and catastrophic injuries. The trial court granted defendant summary disposition on proximate cause. On appeal, the court explained that proximate cause asks “‘whether a defendant should be held legally responsible’” for the consequences and is distinct from cause in fact. It reiterated that proximate cause is for the jury “‘unless reasonable minds could not differ.’” Relying on Deaton and Derbeck, the court held that “‘prior negligent acts in operating’” a vehicle that cause an initial crash do not, standing alone, remain a “‘substantial factor’” in a later collision when the later event is separated by time and intervening decisions. Defendant’s alleged negligence here was “limited to his conduct in causing the first collision[.]” The court agreed with the trial court that plaintiff’s decision to wait nearly 10 minutes before reentering traffic and the other driver’s contemporaneous lane change made the causal chain “so attenuated” that the later crash could not be treated as a foreseeable, legally attributable result of the first crash. The court distinguished cases involving a more direct hazard created by the first incident, including an unattended vehicle taken for a joyride and a destroyed stop sign that remained unrepaired. It concluded that, on these undisputed facts, the remoteness question could be decided as a matter of law. Affirmed.