Children’s removal; MCL 712A.13a(9); MCR 3.965(C)(2)-(4); Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination; Conditioning parenting time on a respondent’s negative drug screens; Distinguishing In re Blakeman; Comparing In re Simpson; Due process; Denial of an adjournment; MCR 3.965(B)(1) & (11); Preliminary hearing procedural requirements

Upholding the trial court’s finding that respondent-mother’s “children were at an imminent risk of harm in her care[,]” the court affirmed its pretrial removal of the children. It also rejected her claim that the order requiring her to “provide negative drug and alcohol screens to have visitation” violated her Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. Finally, it found that the referee did not violate respondent’s due process rights by declining to adjourn a preliminary hearing. “After the trial court authorized the initial petition while ordering that the children remain in” respondent’s care, she tested positive twice for amphetamines, meth, and THC, which she “attributed to her having consumed a substance she believed was Adderall (amphetamine-dextroamphetamine), despite not having a prescription for” it. She also left two of the children (CA and JA) home alone while the eldest (15-year-old HA) “was sleeping without any adult present. Although there was no evidence that HA was generally incapable of caring for the children, her failure to do so in that instance necessitated police involvement to ensure [their] safety. In addition, the CPS worker reported that the pertinent safety plan required respondent[] to ensure that a sober caregiver was available to supervise her children, that all illicit substances were out of the children’s reach, and that CA and JA had appropriate adult supervision.” And CPS learned that the adult respondent insisted she had planned to have watch the children “also had a history of substance abuse.” In light of respondent’s “substance abuse, improper supervision of the children with regard to illicit substances, and the violation of her CPS safety plan, the trial court’s findings” did not leave the court “with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake” was made. As to her Fifth Amendment argument, while she relied on Blakeman, the court found that case factually and legally distinguishable. Rather, Simpson was factually similar as this case did “not involve a coercive choice between admitting to criminal conduct and reunification with her children.” Lastly, the court did not “see how any procedural deficiency in the handling of the” preliminary hearing constituted reversible error.