Municipal referendum; Marshall Charter §§ 5.01 & 5.04; Mandamus; Taxpayers for MI Constitutional Gov’t v Michigan; Appropriations by ordinance & the title-object rule; Marshall Charter § 4.02(a); Enbridge Energy, LP v Michigan; Notice of ordinance hearing; Marshall Charter § 4.02(b); North Burns Park Ass’n v Ann Arbor; Act 425 agreement authority; MCL 124.26(c); Distinguishing Clam Lake Twp v Department of Licensing & Regulatory Affairs

The court held, on remand, that plaintiff-Committee was not entitled to mandamus or declaratory relief because defendant-City’s Ordinance 2023-08 was exempt from referendum as an appropriation ordinance, complied with the City Charter’s title-object and notice requirements, and did not violate the land transfer agreement at issue (the Master 425 Agreement). The City adopted Ordinance 2023-08 rezoning a specific parcel to the City’s I-3 classification and appropriating “$40,000 for site plan review services and $250,000 for building inspection services” for a proposed industrial project. The City Clerk rejected the Committee’s referendum petition as insufficient because the ordinance contained appropriations and because the signature count was inadequate. The trial court granted summary disposition on all counts. The court, in the original appeal, held that the Committee had standing but it affirmed dismissal of the mandamus count because the Committee lacked “a clear legal right” to a referendum under the City Charter and because the Charter provided an “adequate remedy at law” through judicial review. The court rejected the claim that the Charter prohibited appropriations by ordinance, and it held that the ordinance did not violate the Charter’s title-object rule. The court also treated the weekly newspaper notice as published “continuously” through the next issue date and concluded the summary adequately notified the public where the Charter did not require more detail. On remand “for reconsideration in light of Clam Lake Twp,” the court again held that while the Committee had standing it was not entitled to mandamus, the trial court did not err in ruling “that the City could include the appropriations in Ordinance 2023-08[,]” and that the title-object and notice claims lacked merit. As to the claim that Ordinance 2023-08 violated the Master 425 Agreement, in Clam Lake Twp the Supreme Court considered MCL 124.26(c), which permits “participating local units” to bargain over ordinances, including zoning. The court distinguished this case because the alleged recipient of zoning authority was the Joint Planning Commission (JPC), which is not a “local unit” under the Act’s definition, and thus any attempt to transfer zoning power to the JPC would be unenforceable. But the court held “that the City did not contract out its zoning power to the JPC” under the Master 425 Agreement. Schedule A of the Agreement required the JPC to administer land “pursuant to” the City’s or Township’s zoning acts and did not prevent the City from amending the zoning map. The court also dismissed the cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the cross-appellants were not “aggrieved parties” given that intervention was denied. Affirmed.