Motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of a traffic stop; Use of preliminary exam testimony to assess the reliability of a 911 tip; Reasonable suspicion to stop

Although the court found that the circuit court erred when it used 911-caller-B’s preliminary exam testimony to assess the reliability of her tip, it agreed with the prosecution only regarding the reliability of the tip and not as to reasonable suspicion to stop defendant-Anderson. A tip stated two “men were about to depart the fairgrounds on motorcycles and were intoxicated.” Michigan State trooper F was dispatched and stopped Anderson, based only on B’s “tip, without observing any traffic violation.” Anderson was, as B “surmised, driving while intoxicated. Anderson was charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated, third offense[.]” The court noted that he “successfully moved in the circuit court to suppress evidence seized as a result of the traffic stop.” The prosecution argued that B’s “911 call established both that she was reliable as well as reasonable suspicion for [F] to stop Anderson.” To begin, the court agreed “with the circuit court’s observation that [B’s] testimony at the preliminary exam[] contradicted her statements made in the 911 call,” but it disagreed that those contradictions made B “legally unreliable for the purposes of” its Fourth Amendment analysis. “Thus, when assessing the reliability of a tip, the focus is exclusively on the information provided to dispatch and ultimately relayed to the trooper.” When B “made the initial report in this case, she called 911 and gave her name and phone number. This [was] at least partially indicative of reliability.” B informed “the operator that she watched Anderson and his companion drink ‘at least six beers,’ that the two men were asked ‘multiple times’ not to drink on the fairground, that they were about to leave on motorcycles, and that they may have had beers in their cooler on the motorcycles.” Because B “claimed eyewitness knowledge of an alleged crime, and because she called 911 close in time to her observations, her tip [was] entitled to further weight.” B also “provided physical descriptions of the two men and their motorcycles and told the operator the direction the men were heading.” When F “spotted the two men, they and their motorcycles matched the information she received from dispatch. The men were also traveling in the direction stated in [B’s] call and the corroborated information indicates [B’s] reliability as a tipster.” Thus, the court concluded that “at the time the call was placed, [B] was reliable.” Next, the circuit court had to determine whether the information B “provided established reasonable suspicion for [F] to stop Anderson.” Critically absent from B’s tip was “any information [suggesting] Anderson was engaging in crime, beyond [B’s] own conclusions. Moreover, after five minutes of following Anderson and observing his operation of his motorcycle, [F] observed nothing.” Because B’s “tip failed to communicate sufficient information suggesting Anderson was operating a vehicle while intoxicated, [F] had no reasonable suspicion that a crime was afoot.” Affirmed.