Fourth Amendment excessive force claim under 42 USC § 1983; Qualified immunity; Whether defendant-police officer’s use of force when taking plaintiff into custody was objectively reasonable; Graham v Connor; “Threat-to-safety” & “active-resistance” factors under Graham; Whether defendant violated a “clearly established constitutional right”
Concluding there were genuine disputes of material fact relevant to the objective reasonableness of defendant-police officer’s (Janes) use of force when taking plaintiff-Franke into custody, the court reversed the district court’s order granting Janes qualified immunity on Franke’s § 1983 Fourth Amendment excessive force claim. Janes responded to a “fight call” that involved Franke and another man. While on the scene, Franke’s ex-wife approached Janes and told him about an argument she had with Franke. Janes asked her about redness on her neck. “She stated that Franke had ‘pushed [her]’ ‘several times,’ and her husband chimed in that Franke had ‘shoved both of [them].’” After further discussion, a police sergeant directed Janes to detain Franke. Franke alleged that Janes used excessive force when taking him into custody, resulting in a wrist injury. The district court granted Janes qualified immunity on Franke’s federal claim. On appeal, the court, considering the “totality of the circumstances,” held that questions remained as to the “threat-to-safety and active-resistance factors” under Graham. As to the severity of the alleged crime factor, it agreed “with the district court that the circumstances presented during the assault” and domestic violence investigations “gave Janes reason to believe that Franke engaged in physical violence that could justify the use of some degree of force.” But as to Graham’s “immediate threat to safety” factor, it held that questions remained whether Franke stopped walking toward the police vehicle and whether he “struggled against Janes’s guidance to” the vehicle. The court noted that “Janes’s body camera footage does not blatantly undermine Franke’s testimony.” Given that it only had “conflicting testimony regarding whether Franke posed an immediate threat to Janes’s safety[,]” the court concluded that it was for a jury to make credibility determinations and weigh the competing evidence. It also agreed “with Franke that the district court erred when it found there was no genuine dispute of material fact that he resisted Janes’s attempts to detain him.” Finally, it held that it was clearly established by the time of this incident in 3/22 that “a police officer violates a person’s rights during an investigatory detention by using advanced pain compliance techniques—here a half nelson and painfully twisting a wrist with enough force to cause an injury that required surgery—on a handcuffed individual not resisting arrest.” Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.
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