Age discrimination in employment claim; The Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA); One-year limitations period in the employment contract; Rayford v American House Roseville I, LLC; Camelot Excavating Co, Inc v St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins Co

On remand from the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Rayford, the court concluded remand was “necessary for the trial court to properly evaluate whether the shortened limitations period in” the employment contract here was enforceable under Rayford. Thus, it reversed the trial court’s grant of summary disposition to defendant-former employer in part and remanded. In a prior appeal (Robinson III), the court had affirmed the trial court. The Supreme Court vacated Part IV of that opinion, which addressed plaintiff’s age-discrimination claim, and remanded for reconsideration of the claim in light of Rayford. It also ordered that the court was permitted to consider whether the “claim was barred by collateral estoppel.” In Robinson III the court ruled “that plaintiff’s age-discrimination claim was barred by the one-year limitations period in her employment contract.” Pursuant to Rayford, “‘courts must now first determine whether a challenged employment agreement is adhesive and, if so, apply Camelot to determine whether a shortened limitations period is reasonable.’” The court noted that considering Rayford was decided after the trial court rendered its decision, it was unlikely to have “engaged in the requisite Camelot analysis regarding the enforceability of the shortened limitations period in plaintiff’s employment contract.” The court added that, even if it had, the court lacked “the record to review its findings. Thus, remand” was required. As to the collateral estoppel issue, as the court had “no record of the trial court’s decision on this issue, if it rendered one at all[,]” it declined to reach beyond its “authority as a reviewing court to address this issue when we cannot discern whether the trial court ever decided it in the first instance.” It instructed the trial court on remand to also consider “whether plaintiff’s age-discrimination claim is barred by collateral estoppel.”