Change of children’s primary physical custody; MCL 722.27(1)(c); The statutory best-interest factors (MCL 722.23); Factors (b)-(d) & (k); Hearsay; Admission of school-attendance records under MRE 803(6) (the business-records exception); Lay witness opinion testimony; MRE 701; Exclusion of testimony about past events; Harmless error

Holding that the trial court’s errors related to the admission of evidence and in its factual findings on the best-interest factors were harmless, the court affirmed the order changing primary physical custody of the parties’ children from defendant-mother to plaintiff-father. The trial court erred during the best-interests hearing in admitting the children’s school attendance records under MRE 803(6). Plaintiff did not authenticate them with a qualified witness’s testimony. Because he “lacked the qualifications necessary to testify to the elements of MRE 803(6), the trial court made an error of law” in admitting the records. But the court found the error was harmless under the circumstances. The records were not offered “to pinpoint specific absences, but to demonstrate that the children failed to attend school regularly while in defendant’s care, and that their attendance improved while in plaintiff’s care, a point that the parties do not dispute.” In addition, any error in admitting “plaintiff’s lay opinion that he believed that the children were playing video games after their appointed bedtimes was harmless.” And while the trial court erred in precluding defendant “from testifying about domestic violence that plaintiff perpetrated during the marriage” the record indicated it was “more probable than not that the error was not outcome-determinative.” As to the best-interest factors, the court found no error in the trial court’s conclusion that (b) favored plaintiff. But it held that the trial court’s factual findings as to (c) were clearly erroneous and that it erred in weighing factor (d) in plaintiff’s favor. As to (k), even if it were weighed evenly, “the trial court’s determination of the other factors provides ample support for [its] decision to modify the previous custody order.” While it erred as to some of the “factors, the errors were harmless. Even if the factors in question were weighed as neutral between the parties,” the trial court did not give them great weight and ample evidence as to the other factors supported its ruling. Its “decision to modify custody relied primarily on plaintiff’s ability to address the children’s school attendance and improve their academic performance.” Further, the evidence of the change in their attitudes toward him “during and after his makeup parenting time” supported its conclusion that their past reluctance to visit him was due to defendant’s interference.