Ineffective assistance; Failure to call witnesses; People v Jurewicz; Voluntary manslaughter instruction; People v Mendoza; Sentencing proportionality; People v Steanhouse

The court held that defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial and that his within-guidelines sentence for second-degree murder was proportionate. Defendant and a codefendant fought two brothers outside a bar, the victim fell backward after being punched and later died, and defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and AWIGBH. The trial court denied counsel’s withdrawal motion shortly before trial, directed that two attorneys proceed as cocounsel, refused requested self-defense and defense-of-others instructions as unsupported by the evidence, and imposed a 30-year minimum for murder within the 270-to-450-months-or-life guidelines range. On appeal, the court held counsel’s decision not to call defendant’s wife and the younger women from the group was reasonable strategy because their testimony “would not have aided” the defense and did not show any woman was in “immediate danger of harm” when the assaults occurred, a prerequisite to defense of others. The court also credited counsel’s assessment that calling the wife risked impeachment because she admitted lying to police and could open the door to testimony about defendant’s alleged steroid use and “roid rage,” and the Ginther record showed counsel had “investigated” those witnesses and made a “reasonable decision” not to present them. The court next held counsel was not ineffective for declining to request a voluntary manslaughter instruction because a rational view of the evidence did not establish “adequate provocation” that would cause a reasonable person to lose control, and an “all or nothing” approach can be “legitimate trial strategy” where the defendant believed second-degree murder was not proven. Finally, the court upheld the 30-year minimum as proportionate, noting there is no requirement to justify a within-guidelines sentence and emphasizing the trial court’s finding that defendant’s conduct was “particularly violent,” including punching the victim and then “kick[ing] and stomp[ing] him” while he was down and unable to defend himself. Affirmed.