Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); Reasonable reunification efforts; Children’s best interests; Parent-agency treatment plan (PATP)

The court held that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that § (c)(i) was established, that reasonable reunification efforts were made, and that termination was in the children’s best interests. Thus, it affirmed the order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights. DHHS foster-care worker D “explained that from the beginning of the proceedings, DHHS was aware of respondent’s cognitive limitations and made appropriate accommodations for [her] capabilities. [D] also confirmed that in each referral, she specified that respondent was a minor at the time and ‘has some limitations regarding what she can and cannot do due to her age,’ and that she also had cognitive limitations. Contrary to respondent’s” appellate argument, the record showed that she “was not cooperative in participating in most of the services” DHHS offered. While her mother may have hindered respondent’s success, “when made aware of her behavior, DHHS took steps to mitigate her involvement. Faced with the overarching issue that respondent’s cognitive delays hindered her ability to comply with her court-ordered services, DHHS continued to make necessary modifications.” The court noted that while she was more compliant with her plan for a brief period “and her parenting was improving, [her] progress did not endure. She did not take initiative to comply with services and was not visiting [the children] because she felt ‘tired.’ DHHS also coordinated services for” her between three agencies but she failed to contact them “or otherwise follow through, explaining that she had simply forgot, and thus did not complete the initial intake.” As to § (c)(i), one child (JMG) was removed from her care and jurisdiction was “acquired over him because respondent was homeless, did not have the means or ability to care for JMG, had expressed that she did not want to care for JMG, and had been found with JMG riding unsecured in her scooter,” subjecting him to potential harm. Her second child (JTG) was removed from her care because JMG had already been removed. At the time of the 4/23 statutory-grounds stage of the termination hearing, “and later at the best-interest portion of the hearing in [12/23], the conditions that led to the adjudication of both” children continued to exist. The record was also “replete with evidence that respondent continued to struggle with obtaining full compliance with her PATP as to both children.”