Auto negligence; Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA); Governmental immunity; Motor-vehicle exception; Breach; Proximate cause; Gross-negligence exception; Oakland County Sheriff’s Department (OCSD)

Upon de novo review, the court agreed with the trial court that defendant-Deputy Dean was entitled to summary disposition under the GTLA but disagreed that summary disposition was appropriate as to defendant-Oakland County and OCSD. The court found that the first and third elements to establish a prima facie case of negligence did “not appear to be in dispute on appeal—plaintiff suffered damages; and Deputy Dean, as a driver of a motor vehicle, owed plaintiff and others using the roadways a duty ‘to exercise ordinary and reasonable care and caution’ in his operation of the vehicle under the circumstances.” Defendants disputed “the second (breach) and fourth (causation) elements of plaintiff’s claim.” But the court concluded “that both involve questions of fact that must be decided by a jury.” It was “not persuaded by defendants’ argument that the evidence of Dean’s due care generates no question of fact for the jury.” The evidence did show that Dean “activated his emergency lights and siren and that he slowed down as he approached the intersection, but a question of fact remains whether he acted with reasonable care and caution to ‘ensur[e] that any cross-traffic has observed [him] and stopped.’” After initially slowing down, Dean “accelerated into the intersection and the front of his car struck the driver-side door of plaintiff’s vehicle.” At his deposition, Dean “testified that he never saw plaintiff’s car before the collision. A reasonable jury could infer from this evidence that Dean did not look to his right to ensure that all eastbound traffic had stopped, and in failing to do so breached his duty of care.” The court held that there was” evidence from which a jury could find that plaintiff was negligent by failing to yield as required by MCL 257.653(1)(a).” From all the “evidence a reasonable jury could also conclude that plaintiff was not negligent, or alternatively that he was negligent but not more than 50 percent at fault. Accordingly, whether and how much plaintiff was at fault for the accident is a question of fact, so the trial court erred in granting summary disposition to Oakland County and OCSD.” There was no dispute that Dean “was acting within the scope of his authority and engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.” So in order to hold Dean “liable, plaintiff had to plead and be able to prove that Dean’s conduct amounted to gross negligence that was the proximate cause of the injuries at issue.” The court held that “even when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we conclude that Deputy Dean’s conduct did not rise to the level of gross negligence.” Plaintiff initially alleged in his complaint that Dean “entered the intersection without activating his emergency lights and siren, but the record clearly reflects—and plaintiff admitted at his deposition—that Dean did have his emergency lights and siren activated.” The evidence also showed that Dean “slowed down as he approached the intersection, and he proceeded into the intersection after a number of other vehicles had passed or stopped.” Thus, it could not “be said that Deputy Dean acted with ‘a willful disregard of precautions or measures to attend to safety and a singular disregard for substantial risks,’ and we do not believe any reasonable jury could find that his conduct was ‘so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results[.]’” Although the evidence established “a question of fact as to ordinary negligence, that is not enough to establish a question of fact as to gross negligence.” As a result, Dean was “entitled to governmental immunity under the GTLA,” so the trial court did not err in granting summary disposition in his favor. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.