Speedy trial; Barker v Wingo; COVID-19 delay attribution; People v Smith; Assertion of speedy-trial right; People v Cain; Prejudice presumption & rebuttal; People v Williams

The court held that defendant’s constitutional speedy-trial right was not violated under the Barker factors, so dismissal of the municipal-ordinance charges was improper. Defendant was arrested in 7/20 during a protest and first charged with disorderly conduct, but the district court closed for COVID-19 before his motion to dismiss for failure to provide discovery was heard, and the City dismissed that case in 2/21. The City filed new ordinance violation charges in 5/21. After arraignment, the register of actions reflected that defendant requested adjournments and a 2022 jury trial. His case was reassigned multiple times before a final pretrial was set for 4/23. About a week before that hearing, defendant moved to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. The district court granted dismissal. On appeal, the circuit court reversed and reinstated the charges. The court denied his delayed application for leave to appeal but the Supreme Court remanded for the court’s review as on leave granted. Applying Barker, the court agreed the delay (about 33 months) triggered presumed prejudice, but concluded the City rebutted prejudice. The court treated COVID-19 “emergency public-health measures” and resulting backlog as nonattributable to the prosecution. It “‘assigned only minimal weight’” to court-administration reassignment delays. It found defendant contributed by requesting adjournments and, importantly, did not “‘make a formal demand’” for a speedy trial until 4/23. Finally, he showed no personal prejudice or prejudice to the defense. He identified only generalized anxiety, no lost witnesses, and no missing evidence, and body-camera footage remained available. Affirmed.